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GORE ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC. v. COMPTROLLER OF THE
TREASURY: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY
MARYLAND’S DISCONNECTED TAXATION POLICY AND
INIMICAL CORPORATE ATMOSPHERE
SKYLAR LUDWICK *
On March 24, 2014, the Maryland Court of Appeals approved the collection of nearly thirty million dollars in taxes resulting from an audit spanning more than twenty years.1 This windfall was the result of the State’s
victory in Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 2 a
case that had been litigated fiercely for nearly eight years. While the Court
of Appeals’ decision was correct,3 this holding represents the latest tensions
between big business and the State. Ranked forty-second among the nation’s most business-friendly states, 4 Maryland noticeably has lost all but
one of the eleven Fortune 500 companies previously located in the State,
and in addition, a large number of smaller businesses moved to neighboring
states that are viewed as more accommodating to the corporate agenda.5
Maryland’s most recent gubernatorial election embodied the conflict regarding the State’s increased taxation of its residents, as the under-funded
Republican candidate, Larry Hogan, surprisingly defeated the Democratic
candidate, former Lieutenant Governor Anthony Brown, by running on a
tax-driven platform. 6 Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury is a compilation of these critically important issues and presents a
unique opportunity to study the future of Maryland’s economy.
In Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, the
Court of Appeals applied its holding from Comptroller of the Treasury v.
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1. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 87 A.3d 1263
(2014).
2. Id.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. Dennis W. Evans, Maryland’s Fiscal Decline Can Be Tracked, DELMARVA NOW (Sept.
14, 2014), http://www.delmarvanow.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/09/14/dennis-w-evansopinion/15624571/.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
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SYL, Inc. 7 to determine the constitutionality of the State’s taxation of an
out-of-state holding company that did not conduct business in Maryland.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the subsidiaries’ lack of real economic
substance under Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc. sufficiently aggregated the holding companies with their parent company and thus allayed
any constitutional concerns. 8 The Court of Appeals then concluded that the
State had the authority to tax the subsidiaries because they lacked real economic substance and were part of a unitary business that profited from activities conducted in the State.9
The Court of Appeals’ extension of the confounded real economic
substance standard perpetuates the perception that Maryland is hostile to
big business. Although the Court of Appeals arrived at the correct result,
the Gore court should have given more weight to the unitary business principle rather than relying on an incorrect application of the real economic
substance test. The Gore court expended a great deal of effort differentiating the unitary business principle and real economic substance standard only to use the same factors in each analysis. Rather than create a meaningful
distinction between the two tests, the Court of Appeals further muddled the
criteria for state taxation of an out-of-state subsidiary.
I. THE CASE
Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller began when W.L. Gore,
a Delaware corporation founded in 1958,10 challenged the Comptroller’s
2006 audits of its subsidiaries, Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (“GEH”) and
Future Value, Inc. (“FVI”). 11 Established in Delaware in 1983 and 1996,
respectively, Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. and Future Value, Inc. functioned as holding companies for W.L. Gore’s patents and financial assets.12
Gore paid royalties and interest to the companies in return for patent licenses from GEH and loans from FVI. 13 In 2006, the Comptroller issued tax
7. 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003).
8. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 533, 87 A.3d
1263, 1287 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 209 Md. App. 524, 529, 60
A.3d 107, 110 (2013), aff’d, 437 Md. 492, 87 A.3d 1263 (2014). “[W.L.] Gore is known for its
patented ‘ePTFE’ material, which it uses to manufacture industrial and electronic products, as well
as fabrics and medical devices.” Id. Gore has manufacturing facilities in Maryland and sells its
products in the State. Id.
11. Id. at 532, 60 A.3d at 112.
12. Id. at 530–32, 60 A.3d at 111–12. “Gore formed Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (‘GEH’)
in 1983, contributing all Gore patents in exchange for all of GEH’s stock. . . . In 1996, Gore exchanged its financial assets in return for all outstanding stock of its newly-formed subsidiary, Future Value, Inc. (‘FVI’).” Id.
13. Id. at 531–32, 60 A.3d at 111–12. “Delaware amended its income taxation statute to exempt ‘[c]orporations whose activities within Delaware are confined to the maintenance and man-
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assessments against GEH, FVI, and Gore, levying over $26.4 million
against GEH, over $2.6 million against FVI, and almost $200 thousand
against Gore. 14 After the 2006 audit, the Comptroller “determined that
GEH and FVI were required to apportion income to Maryland,” even
though neither company had a physical presence in the State.15 One of the
Comptroller’s hearing officers upheld the assessments against GEH and
FVI in January 2007; 16 the companies then appealed to the Maryland Tax
Court. 17
After a three-day hearing in October 2008, the Maryland Tax Court
upheld the Comptroller’s assessments, but abated the penalties, finding that
a “substantial nexus” existed between the companies and the State and that
the apportionment formula used to arrive at the assessment was fair. 18 The
Tax Court relied on Maryland precedent to address the constitutional concerns surrounding the tax assessments and determined that the required
nexus between the State and the company is “the economic reality of the
fact that the parent’s business in Maryland was what produced the income
of the subsidiar[ies].” 19 On appeal, the Circuit Court for Cecil County reversed the Tax Court’s judgment 20 because the circuit court disagreed with
the Tax Court’s determination that GEH and FVI were part of Gore’s unitary business. 21
Upon the Comptroller’s October 6, 2011 appeal of the circuit court’s
decision, 22 the Court of Special Appeals upheld the Tax Court’s decision.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the Tax Court neither erred in asagement of their intangible investments and the collection and distribution of the income from
such investments or from tangible property physically located outside of Delaware.’” Id. at 529,
60 A.3d at 110 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). This amendment provided Gore with the
incentive to create its subsidiaries because GEH’s and FVI’s income would be exempted from
taxation under the Delaware statute. Id.
14. Id. at 532–33, 60 A.3d at 112.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 533, 60 A.3d at 112.
17. Id. Although nominally described as a court, “the Tax Court is not a court; instead, it is
an adjudicatory administrative agency in the executive branch of state government.” Id. at 535, 60
A.3d at 113–14.
18. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. 07-IN-OO-0084, 2010 Md.
Tax LEXIS 3, at *14–15 (Md. T.C. Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 209 Md. App. 524, 60 A.3d 107 (2013), aff’d, 437 Md. 492, 87 A.3d
1263 (2014).
19. Id. at *13. The Tax Court held that “[t]here is a circular flow of money through royalties,
dividends and loans which support the unitary business of W. L. Gore and its wholly owned subsidiaries, GEH and FVI.” Id. at *14.
20. Gore, 209 Md. App. at 534, 60 A.3d at 113.
21. Id. at 534 n.9, 60 A.3d at 113 n.9. The circuit court characterized GEH as an “independent company” that engaged in “‘its own independent business dealings.’ Similarly, the circuit
court held that each loan between FVI and Gore was ‘an arm’s length transaction between two
Delaware residents; and therefore it, shouldn’t be subject to Maryland tax.’” Id.
22. Id. at 534, 60 A.3d at 113.
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sessing GEH and FVI as taxable entities part of Gore’s unitary business, nor
erred in apportioning the subsidiaries’ income based on the expenses of the
parent corporation. 23 Deferring to the Tax Court, 24 the Court of Special
Appeals focused on the constraints imposed by the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses as limiting Maryland’s ability to tax GEH and FVI under
Tax-General Article, section 10-402. 25
The Court of Special Appeals applied Maryland precedent to dismiss
the constitutional concerns, namely through the application of the unitary
business principle. 26 The unitary business principle was developed by the
Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether an out-of-state
business had a sufficient nexus with the state to allow for taxation under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause of Article One, Section Eight. 27 While applying Maryland precedent, the Court of Special Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s determination that “[a] state may tax an apportioned sum of [a] corporation’s multistate business if the business is ‘unitary.’” 28 Noting that “GEH and FVI
demonstrate the ‘hallmarks’ of a unitary business relationship,”29 the court
reasoned that the subsidiaries’ complete dependence on their parent company satisfied both constitutional concerns, given Gore’s history of activity in
Maryland. 30 The court also resolved Gore’s ancillary argument that the Tax
Court erred by applying trademark precedent to its patent holding company,
stating that the origin of intellectual property law has no effect on how or
where intellectual property is used for state income taxation purposes.31
The Court of Special Appeals closed by expounding on the impracticability
23. Id. at 528-29, 60 A.3d at 110.
24. See id. at 535, 60 A.3d at 114 (“‘It is not our job to substitute our judgment for that of the
Tax Court.’” (quoting Classics Chi., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 189 Md. App. 695, 706,
985 A.2d 593, 599 (2010))). While the Court of Special Appeals reviewed the conclusions of law
de novo, the agency’s decision could only “be affirmed only on the basis of the grounds on which
it decided the case.” Id. (quoting Classics, 189 Md. App. at 707, 985 A.2d at 600).
25. Id. at 536, 60 A.3d at 114. “The Due Process Clause demands that there exist some definite link . . . between a state and the person . . . it seeks to tax . . . . The Commerce Clause forbids
the States to levy taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce . . . .” Id.
26. Id. at 537 & n.11, 60 A.3d at 115 & n.11 (“[I]n a parent-subsidy case, the ‘three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus’ are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland,
the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair.” (quoting Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 104, 825 A.2d 399, 414 (2003))).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. Gore, 209 Md. App. at 537, 60 A.3d at 115 (quoting MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of
Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 25 (2008)).
29. Id. at 538, 60 A.3d at 115–16 (noting that, to qualify as a unitary business, the subsidiary
must demonstrate functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale with the
parent company).
30. Id., 60 A.3d at 115 (“Gore generated income in Maryland and deducted payments to
GEH and FVI, which recognized those payments as their income—an accounting identity that reflects their unified business.”).
31. Id. at 539, 60 A.3d at 116.
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of ignoring “the fact that the ‘expenses’ Gore deducts in Maryland are simultaneous gains to assets on its own balance sheets.” 32 The Maryland Court
of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether the Comptroller had the authority to tax GEH and FVI under the precedent of Comptroller of the
Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 33 and whether the Tax Court erred when it upheld the
apportionment formula used in the assessment of the companies. 34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There is extensive national and state precedent surrounding state taxation of multistate corporations, with the fundamental constitutional tests set
forth by the United States Supreme Court. Part II.A of this Note discusses
the establishment of the unitary business principle and the Supreme Court’s
blessing of apportionment formulas for calculating corporate taxes.35 Part
II.B addresses the application of these precedents by Maryland courts. 36
A state’s ability to tax corporations that conduct business within its
boundaries is sanctioned by the constitutionally protected right of state sovereignty. 37 Before a state may apportion a company’s income, the entity
must have the requisite nexus with the state to overcome constitutional hurdles imposed by the Commerce Clause38 and the Due Process Clause.39
Nexus is established when an entity has a sufficient presence or connection
with the state, although the exact standard for measuring this nexus has varied over time. 40 Increasingly, states are using apportionment formulas to
calculate corporate taxation. 41 Apportioning allows a state to weigh a company’s operations within the state against its overall operations to better

32. Id. at 540, 60 A.3d at 117.
33. 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003).
34. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 502–03, 87 A.3d
1263, 1268–69 (2014).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; U.S. CONST. amend. X; Brian T. Diamond, Comment, Maryland’s Corporate Income Taxation Approach for Multi-Jurisdictional Companies: Moving Toward Uniformity, Yet Still Lacking Ultimate Effectiveness, 63 MD. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (2004).
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Diamond, supra note 37, at 1075 (noting that, while a number of states still adhere to the
physical presence rule established in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the need
to tax multi-jurisdictional corporations has prompted the creation of constructive nexus standards).
41. Laura J. Waterland, Note, Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board:
The Supreme Court Encourages Apportionment Taxation, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 684
(1985). Corporate taxes also can be calculated using the separate accounting or geographical allocation methods. Id. The federal government uses the separate accounting method, which treats
parent corporations and subsidiaries as separate entities for tax purposes so long as the transactions between the two companies were at arm’s length. Id. The geographical allocation method
allows a state to tax in full all income attributed to that state. Id.
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gauge the business’s taxable income. 42 The United States Supreme Court
has had a number of occasions to consider the complexities and controversies surrounding corporate taxation, particularly those associated with apportionment formulas and nexus requirements. 43
A. The United States Supreme Court Developed the Unitary Business
Principle and Approved the Use of Apportionment Formulas to
Account for a Changing Commercial Landscape
The United States Supreme Court has produced an impressive jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of state taxation on out-ofstate assets. 44 The Court’s consideration of state taxation boundaries has
been driven by technological advancements, as conventional tax principles
prevented states from taxing their fair share of multistate business enterprises, such as telegraph companies and railroads. 45 These technological
advancements led the Supreme Court to establish two principles of state
taxation that continue to control the parameters of interstate corporate taxation: the unitary business principle and apportionment formulas. 46
1. The Supreme Court Devised the Unitary Business Principle to
Measure the Relationship Between Parent Companies and Their
Subsidiaries
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution prohibit a state from taxing value earned outside of its borders.47 The Supreme
Court realized that this prohibition produced inequalities in taxation, particularly for an integrated business operating in multiple states where “arriving
at precise territorial allocations of ‘value’ is often an elusive goal, both in
theory and in practice.” 48 In Mobil Oil Corp. and its progeny, the Court de42. Id. The author also notes that “[t]he unitary business principle is the foundation of the
apportionment scheme because this principle defines the operations that factor into the apportionment formula.” Id.
43. See infra Part II.A.
44. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Asarco,
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425 (1980). The Supreme Court produced a series of similar opinions in the Mobil Oil Corp.
line of cases. Generally, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a tax assessment so long as the
assets sought by the state were part of a unitary business and the state apportioned the tax properly.
45. See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 25–26 (2008).
46. See Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438 (rejecting geographical accounting in favor of a
system that accounts for the unitary nature of the business entity); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div.
of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 784 (1992) (authorizing the use of states’ individual apportionment
formulas to approximate the in-state portion of truly multistate activity).
47. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164.
48. Id.
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vised the unitary business principle to “shift the constitutional inquiry from
the niceties of geographic accounting to the determination of the taxpayer’s
business unit.” 49 This shift allowed a state to tax an apportioned share of a
business’s value instead of isolating the value attributable to that business’s
intrastate operations.50
Mobil Oil Corp. and its progeny relied on a long line of Supreme
Court precedent that established that an interstate business “is not immune
from fairly apportioned state taxation.” 51 In particular, this line of jurisprudence drew heavily from Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair 52 to identify
the hurdles that a state must clear before it may constitutionally tax an outof-state corporation. 53 Governmental activity must be fair to satisfy the fair
warning requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause; 54 as such, there
must be a minimal connection between a multistate business’s interstate activity and the taxing state and a rational relationship between the income
generated in the state and the original business enterprise. 55 The Supreme
Court found the Commerce Clause 56 to impose additional requirements pertaining to “the effects of state regulation on the national economy.” 57 The
Court has sustained state taxation against Commerce Clause challenges so
long as “the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”58
Without further guidance, the constitutional hurdles imposed on state
taxation could have resulted in an array of fact-specific precedents lacking
uniformity. The Supreme Court established early on that a business’s income generated in interstate commerce was not immune from state taxation. 59 The Court’s decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes
expanded this line of precedent by creating the unitary business principle.
This principle provides both states and interstate businesses with a list of
discrete factors to determine whether the state may tax the business’s activity within that state.60
49. MeadWestvaco Corp., 553 U.S. at 26.
50. Id.
51. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 436.
52. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
53. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 436–37.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
55. Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 272–73.
56. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
57. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312.
58. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
59. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436 (1980).
60. Id. at 438. The Court established the unitary business principle to provide objectivity to a
rather subjective and fact-specific inquiry. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504
U.S. 768, 785 (1992) (noting that “the relevant unitary business inquiry [ is] one which focuses on
the objective characteristics of [an] asset’s use and its relation to the taxpayer and its activities
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To constitute a unitary business, the business must exhibit “contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.” 61 The Court has not wavered in its application of this test, both in upholding state taxation62 and in rejecting state
taxation. 63 Where the business entity contests the state’s ability to tax its
income, the taxpayer bears the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the tax.64 Both Mobil Oil Corp. 65 and Container Corp. of America 66
presented circumstances in which the Court applied the unitary business
principle to uphold a state’s taxation of a multistate enterprise. In Mobil Oil
Corp., the Court faced a petroleum business that conducted its operations in
over forty states and abroad. 67 Establishing and applying the unitary business principle, the Court reasoned that a corporation’s attempt to classify its
subsidiaries as separate businesses must fail when the income generated by
those entities is “derived from a functionally integrated enterprise.” 68 In
Container Corp. of America, under similar circumstances, the Court found
that the corporation’s assistance to its subsidiaries merited state taxation as
a unitary business, despite the salient differences in the companies’ operations. 69
On other occasions, the Court’s application of the unitary business
principle found state taxation had fallen short of satisfying the required constitutional hurdles. 70 While the Court has long held that the Constitution
imposes no single formula on states for evaluating the activity of an integrated business enterprise, 71 the Court historically has assessed those forwithin the taxing State”). By establishing definite criteria qualifying a business as unitary or otherwise, the Court provided clarity to a complex area of jurisprudence.
61. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438 (noting “that separate accounting, while it purports to
isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to income” generated through a unitary business).
62. Id. at 439 (finding that Mobil “has made no effort to demonstrate that the foreign operations of its subsidiaries and affiliates are distinct in any business or economic sense from its petroleum sales activities in Vermont” to defeat the unitary business principle).
63. Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (holding that
ASARCO’s subsidiaries were not sufficiently under the parent’s control to qualify as a unitary
business); see also id. at 327 (declining to accept “a definition of ‘unitary business’ that would
permit nondomiciliary States to apportion and tax dividends ‘[w]here the business activities of the
dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State” (alteration in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 442)).
64. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 175 (1983).
65. 445 U.S. at 439–40.
66. 463 U.S. at 179–80.
67. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 428.
68. Id. at 440 (acknowledging that “[o]ne must look principally at the underlying activity, not
at the form of investment, to determine the propriety of apportionability”).
69. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 179–80.
70. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 790 (1992); Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1992).
71. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164.
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mulas using the unitary business principle.72 In Asarco, Inc., the Court held
that the unitary business principle could not successfully be applied where
the subsidiary and parent companies are not sufficiently connected. 73
While the Court has been unwilling to find the existence of a unitary
business “[w]here the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing
to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State,”74 the Court
made clear in Container Corp. of America that a unitary business may exist
even when the relationship between the parent and subsidiary is less conventional and more distanced or abstract. 75 Mobil Oil Corp. and its progeny
affirm that “the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business principle.” 76
2.

The Court Allowed the Use of Apportionment Formulas to
Determine the Amount of Taxable Activity that an Entity
Conducted in the State

While the unitary business principle provides the requisite nexus with
the taxing state to satisfy the Due Process and Commerce Clauses,77 the apportionment formula used by the state to determine the taxable amount also
must meet the constitutional requirement of fairness.78 Outside of the insistence on fairness, the Court largely leaves the states free to fashion the
substance of their apportionment formula.79 In Allied-Signal, Inc., the
Court blessed the use of individualized apportionment formulas by the
states. 80 But, the Court went on to draw a slight restriction on the composition of the formula in Container Corp. of America. 81 In Container Corp. of
America, the Court noted its disapproval of a one-factor apportionment
72. See Allied-Signal, Inc., 504 U.S. at 784; Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312; Container Corp.,
463 U.S. 159; Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp.,
445 U.S. 425.
73. Asarco, Inc., 458 U.S. at 322.
74. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 442.
75. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 178 (“The prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of goods.”).
76. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 439.
77. Id. at 442 (“Where the business activities . . . have nothing to do with the activities . . . in
the taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, because there
would be no underlying unitary business.”).
78. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 780 (1992). The Court recognized that while states have “wide authority to devise formulae for an accurate assessment of a
corporation’s intrastate value or income,” there also is a “necessary limit on the States’ authority
to tax value or income that cannot in fairness be attributed to the taxpayer’s activities within the
State.” Id.
79. Id. at 784 (“To be sure, our cases give States wide latitude to fashion formulae designed
to approximate the in-state portion of value produced by a corporation’s truly multistate activity.”).
80. Id.
81. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 183 (1983).
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formula. 82 According to the Court, one-factor formulas, based on things
like the ownership of tangible property, 83 may appear fair on its face, but in
practice “‘operates so as to reach profits which are in no just sense attributed to transactions within its jurisdiction.’” 84 Instead, the Court advocated
the use of three-factor apportionment formulas, noting that these types of
calculations were more likely to avoid the sort of distortions presented by
one-factor methods. 85
B. The Maryland Courts Expanded upon the Precedents Established
by the United States Supreme Court, Namely by Inquiring into the
Real Economic Substance of a Subsidiary
The Maryland Court of Appeals has had many occasions to evaluate
the constitutionality of state taxation of out-of-state assets using the unitary
business principle and apportionment formula. 86 The Court of Appeals’ use
of the unitary business principle and the apportionment formula guidelines
has colored its discussion of the state taxation statute. 87 In particular, the
Court of Appeals has applied the Supreme Court’s discussion of threefactor apportionment formulas 88 as a way to discuss the formula used by the
State and the fluctuations that occur when attempting to levy additional taxes. 89
82. Id.
83. See Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell 283 U.S. 123, 129 (1931).
84. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 183 (quoting Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc., 283 U.S. at 134). In
citing Hans Rees’, the Court notes that it struck down an apportionment method based entirely on
ownership of tangible property. Id. According to the Court, one-factor apportionment formula are
“purposely skewed to resolve all doubts in favor of the State,” and thus do not represent a fair accounting of the corporation’s taxable intrastate activities. Id.
85. Id. at 183–84. Specifically, the Court approved of California’s three-factor formula,
which includes a corporation’s payroll, property, and sales. Id. at 183. The Court held that these
factors in combination “reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated.”
Id.
86. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003);
Hercules, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 351 Md. 101, 716 A.2d 276 (1998); NCR Corp. v.
Comptroller of the Treasury, 313 Md. 118, 544 A.2d 764 (1988); Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Atlantic Supply Co., 294 Md. 213, 448 A.2d 955 (1982); Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury, 290 Md. 126, 428 A.2d 1208 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Xerox Corp., 290 Md. at 127–128, 428 A.2d at 1210 (“This case presents the
question whether Maryland taxation of an apportioned amount of certain interest and royalty income earned by a corporation engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce was proper under relevant statutory and constitutional standards.”).
88. See supra Part II.A.
89. Xerox Corp., 290 Md. at 130, 428 A.2d at 1211 (“[A] corporation must compute its Maryland tax liability by using a three-factor (sales, property and payroll) apportionment formula . . . .
The numerator of the sales factor . . . is the amount of a corporation’s in-state sales; the denominator of the sales factor is the total amount of a corporation’s in-state and out-of-state sales. The
property and payroll factors are computed in the same manner. The three factors are averaged and
the resulting fraction, expressed as a percentage, is multiplied by the corporation’s business income. The resulting dollar amount constitutes the business income apportioned to this State.”).
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While the Court of Appeals has attempted to reconcile the actions of
the State with the Supreme Court’s decisions, the nature of the inquiry has
led to the creation of a very fact-specific set of precedents. 90 Deciding its
cases based on factors incident and unique to the business in question, the
Court of Appeals has been unwilling to sanction taxation in cases where income stemmed from out-of-state investment decisions; 91 yet the Court of
Appeals has proven to be more flexible in cases where the income produced
out-of-state is related to the business’s activities within Maryland. 92 The
Court of Appeals’ earlier decisions were focused largely on independently
operating subsidiaries or investment corporations, allowing the court to apply the unitary business analysis and apportionment formulas set out by the
Supreme Court. 93
As the court began to deal with “phantom” entities,94 it was forced to
redesign the constitutional inquiry once served by the unitary business principle and the apportionment formula. 95 The Court of Special Appeals, in
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corp., tailored the constitutional inquiry to incorporate a finding of real economic substance, because the former consideration of a corporation’s property, payroll, and
sales was “flawed due to the very nature of a [phantom corporation], which
has no tangible property or employees and can only conduct its activity and
do business through branches of its unitary affiliated parent.” 96
The Court of Appeals adopted and broadened this standard in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., where it rejected the corporation’s contention that Armco “applies only where the subsidiary lacks all substance or
90. Id. at 142–144, 428 A.2d at 1217–18. The Maryland Court recognizes that the taxation
statute “prescribes taxation of so much of a corporation’s net income as is constitutionally permissible.” Id. at 142, 428 A.2d at 1217. To determine that amount, the court must engage in a
piecemeal investigation of the corporation’s intra- and interstate activities. Id. at 142–44, 428
A.2d 1217–18. This type of investigation lends itself to the creation of a fact-specific opinion,
since every corporation is likely to engage in different behaviors and operate under a different set
of factors. Id.
91. Hercules, Inc., 351 Md. at 114–15, 716 A.2d at 282–83 (“Seemingly the strategic decision to discontinue an investment in one area of activity in order to concentrate resources elsewhere is no more an operating function in the case before us than was the strategic decision in Allied-Signal.”).
92. Xerox Corp., 290 Md. at 144, 428 A.2d at 1218.
93. See Hercules, Inc., 351 Md. at 111, 716 A.2d at 280 (concerning the creation and subsequent liquidation of a separate chemical company, particularly the capital gains realized from the
sale of Hercules’s stock in the company); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 313 Md.
118, 122, 544 A.2d 764, 765 (1988) (assessing the income produced by the worldwide sale of
NCR’s products); Xerox Corp., 290 Md. at 130, 428 A.2d at 1211 (addressing the corporation’s
foreign subsidiaries and the royalty income produced by the licensing of the Xerox name and
products).
94. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corp., 82 Md. App. 429, 430, 572
A.2d 562, 563 (1990).
95. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 84, 825 A.2d 399, 402 (2003).
96. Armco Export Sales Corp., 82 Md. App. at 435, 572 A.2d at 566.
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is a ‘phantom’ corporation.” 97 Instead, the Court of Appeals found that a
company’s real economic substance may be challenged even when it appears to have a “touch of ‘window dressing.’”98 The Court of Appeals also
adopted the tailored test for the application of the unitary business principle
and apportionment formula to entities whose economic substance is in
question: “‘The three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus were
affirmatively established in [Armco]. They are: 1) The parent is engaged in
business in Maryland. 2) The parent is unitary with the [company in question]. 3) The apportionment formula is fair.’” 99
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, affirming the
Tax Court’s decision to allow the Comptroller to tax Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc., and Future Value, Inc., as part of a unitary business through the
use of an apportionment formula. 100 In addressing the State’s authority to
tax GEH and FVI, the court looked to Maryland precedent, particularly
Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 101 to both determine the constitutionality of the Comptroller’s actions and address the petitioners’ peripheral
arguments. 102 The court’s analysis of the apportionment formula used by
the Comptroller departed from Maryland precedent, and instead upheld the
formula based on the statutes allowing for this type of taxation.103
A. Maryland Precedent Concerning Taxation of Out of State
Subsidiaries
Before introducing the reasoning behind its decision, the Court of Appeals narrowed the breadth and scope of its analysis; openly announcing its
deference to the Tax Court’s holding. 104 First addressing the federal consti97. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 105, 825 A.2d at 414.
98. Id. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
99. Id. at 104, 825 A.2d at 414 (quoting Armco Export Sales Corp., 82 Md. App at 436, 572
A.2d at 566).
100. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 503, 87 A.3d
1263, 1269 (2014).
101. 375 Md. 28, 825 A.2d 399 (2003).
102. See infra Part II.A.
103. See infra Part II.B.
104. Gore, 437 Md. at 503–04, 87 A.3d at 1269; see also Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury,
422 Md. 111, 136–37, 29 A.3d 475, 489–90 (2011). The Court of Appeals notes that the Tax
Court receives the same judicial review as other agencies, however, in this context, the court looks
through the decisions of the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals to evaluate the decision of
the agency. Gore, 437 Md. at 503–04, 87 A.3d at 1269. Noting that they cannot uphold the decision “on grounds other than the findings and reasons set forth by [the Tax Court],” the Court of
Appeals is careful not to overstep the “expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative
agency.” Id.
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tutional issues surrounding the Comptroller’s authority to tax GEH and
FVI, the court employed Maryland precedent to guide its analysis.105 Responding to the petitioners’ contention that GEH and FVI lacked the sufficient nexus with Maryland for the Comptroller’s taxes to be constitutional,
the court reasoned that the “distinct but parallel limitations” imposed by the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses were satisfied by the Unitary Business
test. 106
While the court acknowledged that the unitary business principle determines the portion of out-of-state revenue that may be taxed, 107 the court
drew on Maryland precedent to add the caveat that the unitary business
principle may not be used to clear the hurdles established by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses when a taxpayer disputes his or her nexus with
the State. 108 Having reasoned that a constitutional analysis must precede
the use of the unitary business principle, the Gore court arrived at its desired starting point: a comparison between the current petitioners and the
petitioners involved in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc. 109
A discussion of the prominent precedent of Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL preceded the court’s factual discussion of Gore, where the court
reminded the petitioner that “Maryland’s ability to tax two distinct companies that had little obvious connection to Maryland, but were subsidiaries of
parent companies that had significant business ties with the State,” already
had been affirmed. 110 Discussing the facts of SYL, the court detailed the
subsidiaries’ complete dependence on their parent company, drawing similarities between the SYL subsidiaries’ management of patents and financial

105. Gore, 437 Md. at 506, 87 A.3d at 1271. The Court of Appeals underscores its ability to
decide on the constitutionality of the tax by noting that “[a]gency decisions premised upon case
law, however, are not entitled to deference.” Id. at 505, 87 A.3d at 1270 (citing Frey, 422 Md. at
138, 29 A.3d at 490). Because the Tax Court used the reasoning of Comptroller of the Treasury v.
SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003), to guide its decision regarding the constitutionality
of the tax, the Court of Appeals is able to conduct an independent review without granting deference to the Tax Court. Id.
106. Id. at 508, 87 A.3d at 1271 (quoting MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553
U.S. 16, 24 (2008)). The Court of Appeals notes that the Due Process Clause requires that an entity has “‘fair warning’” before it is taxed by the State whereas the Commerce Clause dictates a
four-part test that must be followed: the tax must be applied to an entity “‘with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’” Id. at 507–08, 87 A.3d 1271 (quoting
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308, 312 (1992).
107. Id. at 508, 87 A.3d at 1272.
108. Id. at 509–10, 87 A.3d at 1272 (noting that “NCR made clear that the unitary business
principle cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses; rather, it is a principle that allows apportionment of entities already deemed taxable”).
109. Id. at 510, 87 A.3d at 1273 (noting the factual similarities between Gore and SYL, the
court uses this precedent as their vehicle of constitutional analysis).
110. Id. at 511, 87 A.3d at 1273 (footnote omitted) (citing SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 80, 825 A.2d
at 400).
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assets to the comparable functions performed by FVI and GEH. 111 Given
the parallel structure and operation of the Gore and SYL subsidiaries, the
court reasoned that the Tax Court was correct in applying the SYL standard
to evaluate the constitutional requirements for state taxation of GEH and
FVI. 112
Reviewing the Tax Court’s findings, 113 the Gore court employed the
Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL standard 114 of “real economic substance” to transition to a discussion of the unitary business principle. 115
Although the court previously shied away from the use of the unitary business principle, 116 it suggested that “there is no reason—based either in case
law or logic—for holding that the factors that indicate a unitary business
cannot also be relevant in determining whether subsidiaries have no real
economic substance as separate business entities.” 117 The court agreed with
the Tax Court’s finding that, although GEH and FVI may have been created
for legitimate business reasons and conducted arm’s-length transactions
with their parent company, 118 the subsidiaries lacked real economic substance under Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, which required the court
“to determine whether the subsidiaries have economic substance as separate entities.” 119 This reasoning illustrated that the court held GEH and
FVI’s alleged business functions to be little more than “window dressing”
that did “not imbue GEH and FVI with substance as separate entities.”120
111. Id. at 511–13, 87 A.3d at 1273–74.
112. Id. at 515-16, 87 A.3d at 1276 (“Thus, the Tax Court identified the correct legal standard,
inquiring whether GEH and FVI were subsidiaries with ‘no real economic substance as separate
business entities’ under SYL.” (quoting SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415)).
113. Id. at 517, 87 A.3d at 1277 (“From these findings, the Tax Court highlighted the subsidiaries’ dependence on Gore for their income, the circular flow of money between the subsidiaries
and Gore, the subsidiaries’ reliance on Gore for core functions and services, and the general absence of substantive activity . . . .”).
114. Id. at 519, 87 A.3d at 1278 (“[O]ur inquiry under SYL requires us to determine whether
the subsidiaries have economic substance as separate entities.”).
115. Id. at 518, 87 A.3d at 1278.
116. Id. at 509, 87 A.3d at 1272 (“Where, as here, the taxpayer disputes its nexus with Maryland, the unitary business principle cannot be used to clear the constitutional hurdles of the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses.”).
117. Id. at 518, 87 A.3d at 1278. Previously, the Court of Appeals had distinguished between
“real economic substance” and the “unitary business principle,” asserting that only the former satisfied constitutional requirements presented by the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Id.
Here, however, the court chose to incorporate the unitary business features of “functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale,” to indicate lack of real economic substance. Id. at 531, 87 A.3d at 1285 (quoting Mead Westvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553
U.S. 16, 30 (2008)).
118. Id. at 519, 87 A.3d at 1278.
119. Id.
120. Id., 87 A.3d at 1278–79. While the petitioners tried to distance themselves from the subsidiaries in SYL, the court found that their arguments fell flat. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that while GEH and FVI may have been created for legitimate business purposes, the companies’
motivation is much less dispositive than the subsidiaries’ lack of substantive activities. Id. The

2015] Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury 1045
The Gore court stretched Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL precedent beyond its initial constitutional inquiry to address the petitioners’ “peripheral arguments.” 121 Dismissing a claim that the Comptroller usurped
legislative function and improperly aggregated Gore and its subsidiaries in
order to create nexus, the court fell back on its argument under Comptroller
of the Treasury v. SYL and held that the unitary business principle cannot be
used to establish nexus where one does not exist.122 The court reaffirmed
that nexus had been properly established under the SYL standards as “the
entities’ lack[ed] . . . economic substance as separate business entities.” 123
Because the subsidiaries in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL were found
to lack substance as separate entities, the Gore court rested on the aforementioned similarities between the two sets of subsidiaries to establish that
GEH and FVI possessed the required nexus with the state. 124
The court found the petitioners’ second argument, concerning “an improper disregard for the corporate form under Maryland law,”125 equally
unavailing, noting that acceptance of this argument would prohibit the court
from looking to “the realities of the relationship between a parent and subsidiary” when determining the amount of income traceable to Maryland. 126
As such a principle would “require an outright rejection of SYL,” the court
maintained that overturning the Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL precedent is something that “we shall not do.” 127 Finally, the court rebuffed the
petitioners’ argument that the use of Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL
improperly transforms federal patent law from a negative right into a positive right, thereby creating ties to Maryland where such ties do not exist. 128
The court reasoned that the patents between Gore and GEH contain the positive language that permits Gore to “make, use and sell any patented inventions,” owned by GEH. 129 Ultimately, the court was unconvinced that the

court places a heavy emphasis on Gore’s permeation of both companies, describing the relationship as “so intertwined with Gore as to be almost inseparable.” Id., 87 A.3d at 1279–80.
121. Id. at 522-28, 87 A.3d at 1280–84.
122. Id. at 522–23, 87 A.3d at 1280–81.
123. Id. at 523, 87 A.3d at 1281.
124. Id. (“In this case, nexus has been satisfied, under SYL, by the entities’ lack of economic
substance as separate business entities. Another way of viewing the SYL standard is the recognition that the parent’s activity is what generates the subsidiary’s income.”).
125. Id. at 523, 87 A.3d at 1281 (“Petitioners invoke Maryland’s long-settled precedent that
‘[t]he corporate entity will be disregarded only when necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a
paramount equity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Stein v. Smith, 358 Md. 670, 682, 751 A.2d
505, 510 (2000))).
126. Id. at 524, 87 A.3d at 1281.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 525–27, 87 A.3d at 1282–83 (“Petitioners claim that trademarks are inseparable
from their covered product . . . requir[ing] contact with the forum state that a patent license simply
does not.”).
129. Id. at 527, 87 A.3d at 1283.
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intellectual property distinction “is a distinction with a difference when it
comes to taxation.” 130
B. Statutes Authorizing the Apportionment Formula
The court’s treatment of the apportionment formula rests largely on its
interpretation of the specific taxation statutes.131 While the petitioners argued that the Comptroller both ignored a binding regulation and applied a
fundamentally unfair apportionment formula, the court reasoned that the
language of the statute and the regulation alone merit rejection of that argument. 132 The court noted that both the statute and the regulation operate
with exceptions that allow the Comptroller to alter the formula when it
“‘does not fairly represent the extent of a corporation’s activity in [the]
State.’” 133
As to the alleged unfairness of the apportionment formula, the court
reasoned away the petitioners’ argument, noting that the use of an apportionment formula is authorized by the unitary business principle and constrained by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.134 As such, according
to the Gore court, the Comptroller’s actions were permissible so long as the
existence of a unitary business had been shown and a rational relationship
between the taxing state and the taxpayer’s enterprise was established. 135
Given that the court already had decided on the existence of a unitary business, it shifted its review of apportionment schemes to follow the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 136 in
which the court evaluated the internal and external consistency of the ap-

130. Id.
131. Id. at 528, 87 A.3d at 1284 (focusing on the interplay between Tax-General Article, section 10-402(a) and Regulation 03.04.03.08(C)(3)(d)). Section 10-402(a) requires a corporation to
allocate to the State the part of the corporation’s income that is reasonably attributable to the trade
or business carried on in the State. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-402(a)(2) (LexisNexis
2010). Regulation 03.04.03.08(C)(3)(d) refers to income derived from intangibles, requiring a
taxpayer earning this type of income to be subject to a three-factor payroll and property formula.
MD. CODE REGS. 03.04.03.08(C)(3)(d) (2014)
132. Id. at 529, 87 A.3d at 1284.
133. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Md. CODE REGS. 03.04.03.08(F)(1) (2014)). “As Respondent correctly points out, the three factor formula set forth by [the statute and regulation]
would have yielded an apportionment factor of zero, which did not fairly represent the subsidiaries’ activity in Maryland.” Id.
134. Id. at 529–30, 87 A.3d at 1284–85.
135. Id. at 530-31, 87 A.3d at 1285. According to the court, “[a] unitary business features
functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale.” Id. at 531, 87 A.3d at
1285. Noting that the Tax Court found that GEH and FVI demonstrated each of these components, the court is left to conclude that “the Tax Court did not err in concluding that Gore, GEH,
and FVI were engaged in a unitary business.” Id., 87 A.3d at 1286.
136. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
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portionment formula. 137 While the court followed the reasoning of the
Court of Special Appeals in holding the formula internally consistent,138 the
court reasoned that the apportionment formula was also externally consistent as it fairly captured “Gore’s expenses in Maryland—expenses that
simultaneously constituted income for GEH and FVI.” 139
IV. ANALYSIS
In Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller 140 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the Comptroller had the authority to tax out-ofstate holding companies under Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL141 without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Commerce Clause of Article One of the United States Constitution. Although the court arrived at the correct result, the Court of Appeals’ extenuation of the confounded real economic substance standard perpetuates the
perception that Maryland is hostile to big business. The Gore court should
have given more weight to the unitary business principle rather than relying
on an incorrect application of the real economic substance test. The Gore
court expended great effort differentiating the unitary business principle and
the real economic substance test only to use the same factors in each determination. Rather than create a meaningful distinction between the two
tests, the Court of Appeals further muddled the criteria for state taxation of
out-of-state subsidiaries.
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in Its Reliance on the Real Economic
Substance Standard and Its Misuse of the Unitary Business
Principle
The Court of Appeals reached the correct holding in Gore Enterprise
Holdings v. Comptroller because it would have been detrimental to deprive
137. Gore, 437 Md. at 532, 87 A.3d at 1286. For an apportionment formula to be constitutional, it must be internally and externally consistent. Id. Internal consistency dictates that the
“‘formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of
the unitary business’s income being taxed.’” Id. (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169). External consistency, the more difficult requirement, requires that the “‘factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.’” Id.
(quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 533, 87 A.3d at 1287.
140. 437 Md. 492, 87 A.3d 1263 (2014). The Court of Appeals ruled that the Comptroller’s
taxation of two of W.L. Gore and Associates’ subsidiaries was constitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals found that the subsidiaries’ lack of
separate business identities created a sufficient nexus with the state to allow for taxation.
141. 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003). The Court of Appeals upheld the taxation of a Syms,
Inc., subsidiary on the grounds that the holding company lacked substantial economic substance.
The Court of Appeals pointed to the subsidiary’s dependence on its parent company as creating a
sufficient nexus with the State.
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the State of taxes it was properly due. However, the court’s reasoning does
little to clarify an already complicated assortment of Maryland precedent.142
As much as the court relied on its reasoning in Comptroller of the Treasury
v. SYL, Inc., the court may have felt as though it was simply extending established precedent to resolve the case.143 In reality, the court’s actions
pulled Maryland further away from establishing a clear test to determine attributional nexus between the State and the out-of-state corporation. 144
The Gore court erred when it attempted to create a constitutional nexus
between the Gore subsidiaries and the State by layering the unitary business
principle and the real economic substance test. The United States Supreme
Court has advocated the use of the unitary business principle as an effective
means to address Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns stemming
from taxation of out-of-state entities. 145 While the unitary business principle does not fully satisfy all constitutional concerns, 146 it is considered “the
linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation.”147 Although the Gore court acknowledged that the unitary business principle allows a state to calculate the portion of out-of-state revenue it may tax, the
court confusingly dismisses the unitary business principle as insufficient to
clear the constitutional hurdles where the taxpayer disputes its nexus with
Maryland. 148 The Court of Appeals is correct in its understanding that the
unitary business principle is not the sole factor in determining the constitutionality of a tax, 149 however its use of the real economic substance test to

142. Diamond, supra note 37, at 1081 (noting that, although “Maryland began to consider the
limits of permissible income taxation on multi-jurisdictional corporations” in the 1980s, “the evaluation method to establish attributional nexus remained underdeveloped, as no single theory prevailed”).
143. Gore, 437 Md. at 517, 87 A.3d at 1277 (noting that there are “indisputable parallels” between Gore and SYL, Inc.).
144. Diamond, supra note 37, at 1091 (“Instead of applying a single nexus theory, the Court
of Appeals in SYL employed components from several different methods to reach its decision,
which likely will cause confusion for courts and businesses in the future.”). The Gore court’s reliance on Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003), thus promotes rather than quells the confusion, as the court in the present case builds on, rather than condenses, the several theories used in SYL.
145. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438–39 (1980) (noting that an
out-of-state entity may be considered part of a unitary business if it demonstrates “functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale”).
146. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983).
147. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 439.
148. Gore, 437 Md. at 509, 87 A.3d 1272 (“But the [unitary business] principle does not confer nexus to allow a state to directly tax a subsidiary based on the fact that the parent company is
taxable and that the parent and subsidiary are unitary.”).
149. Walter Hellerstein, MeadWestvaco and the Scope of the Unitary Business Principle, 108
J. TAX’N 261, 261 (2008).
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perform essentially the same function as the unitary business principle is
misguided. 150
The Court of Appeals began using the real economic substance test
when the transient nature of an entity did not allow for traditional apportionment of the company’s property, payroll, or sales. 151 As set forth in
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corp., the real economic substance test consists of “three key elements necessary for constitutional
nexus:” whether the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, whether the
parent is unitary with the entity in question, and whether the apportionment
formula is fair. 152 The Gore court goes to great lengths to distinguish the
real economic substance test from the unitary business principle.153 But, the
distinction is all but erased when the court holds that “there is no reason—
based either in case law or logic—for holding that the factors that indicate a
unitary business cannot also be relevant in determining whether subsidiaries
have no real economic substance as separate business entities.”154
The Court of Appeals’ unexplained reliance on the real economic substance test promoted by Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL155 and Armco
undermines the time-tested Supreme Court precedent in favor of a standard
established by the Court of Special Appeals.156 The real economic substance test was crafted to address the emergence of domestic international
sales corporations, or DISCs, 157 which allowed multistate enterprises to export their otherwise taxable profits and thus receive a tax exemption.158 In
its effort to gauge the existence of the requisite constitutional nexus between the DISC and the state, the Court of Special Appeals established the
aforementioned three key elements.159 The origin of these factors is glaringly vague, as the Court of Special Appeals claims they were affirmatively
established in prior DISC cases 160 without specifying the precise rationale
for their creation. Neither the Court of Special Appeals nor the Court of
Appeals explained the advantages or constitutional benefits associated with
150. Gore, 437 Md. at 515–16, 87 A.3d at 1276 (finding that “the Tax Court identified the
correct legal standard, inquiring whether GEH and FVI were subsidiaries with ‘no real economic
substance as separate business entities’ under SYL” (quoting Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL,
Inc., 375 Md. 78, 106, 825 A.2d 399, 415 (2003))).
151. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corp., 82 Md. App. 429, 435, 572
A.2d 562, 566 (1990).
152. Id. at 436, 572 A.2d at 566.
153. Gore, 437 Md. at 509, 87 A.3d at 1272 (noting that the unitary business principle is not a
jurisdictional principle and does not have the power to clear constitutional hurdles).
154. Id. at 518, 87 A.3d at 1278.
155. 375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
156. See Armco, 82 Md. App at 436, 572 A.2d at 566.
157. Id. at 430, 572 A.2d at 563.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 436, 572 A.2d at 566.
160. Id.
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using the real economic substance standard, as opposed to the unitary business principle, to evaluate a company’s vulnerability of being taxed in Maryland. 161
The Gore court’s reliance on the SYL court’s decision to use the real
economic business standard is misguided. 162 The court in Comptroller of
the Treasury v. SYL makes an unexplained logical leap, spending a length
of time exploring the Supreme Court’s unitary business formula before discarding those considerations in favor of the Armco real economic substance
test. 163 The Gore court erred in building its opinion around a similar logical
leap, conflating the unitary business principle and economic substance
test. 164 In its attempt to rationalize this heavy-handed reliance on the precedent of Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL and the real economic substance
standard, the Gore court insisted that the unitary business principle was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional concerns at play. 165
Instead of explaining the alleged insufficiencies of the unitary business
principle, the Gore court moves to an errant discussion of the facts and
holding in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL. 166 While the two cases certainly are factually similar, 167 the shared circumstances should not have
prevented the Gore court from examining the merits of the case independently and without the heavy influence from the prior decision in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL. Prefacing its analysis of the case at hand on
the holding and facts of SYL, the Gore court departed from the fact-specific
inquiry that the Supreme Court encouraged in matters of state taxation. 168
161. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003); Armco,
82 Md. App. 429, 572 A.2d 562.
162. See Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 510, 87
A.3d 1263, 1273 (2014).
163. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 103, 825 A.2d at 413 (transitioning from its discussion of the unitary business principle and concluding that the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in Armco
is “more pertinent” to the resolution of the case, without explaining how or why that decision is
more important than Supreme Court precedent).
164. Gore, 437 Md. at 509, 87 A.3d at 1272 (“Where, as here, the taxpayer disputes its nexus
with Maryland, the unitary business principle cannot be used to clear the constitutional hurdles of
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.”).
165. Id. It is unclear how the court arrived at the conclusion that the unitary business principle
cannot be used to clear the Due Process and Commerce Clause hurdles, as Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that the unitary business principle was established for that precise purpose.
See Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 316–317 (1982).
166. Gore, 437 Md. at 510, 87 A.3d at 1273 (“One of our more recent cases, Comptroller of
the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., shares many factual similarities to the present case. Thus, we will now
examine SYL and its applicability to this case.” (citation omitted)).
167. Id. at 511, 87 A.3d at 1273 (observing that SYL involved the taxation of “two distinct
companies that had little obvious connection to Maryland, but were subsidiaries of parent companies that had significant business ties with the State”(footnote omitted)).
168. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) (“In the case of a
more-or-less integrated business enterprise operating in more than one State, however, arriving at
precise territorial allocations of ‘value’ is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice.”).
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The Gore court appeared to engage in a comparison between the present
case and Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, rather than an independent
analysis, admitting that it relied on “indisputable parallels between GEH,
FVI and the SYL subsidiaries to hold that [they] lacked substance . . . and
consequently satisfied the constitutional requirements for taxation in Maryland.” 169
The Gore court’s deference to Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL in
using the real economic substance standard demonstrates a disregard for
Supreme Court precedent and further clouds the standard for commercial
taxation in Maryland. In justifying its use of the real economic substance
standard, the court classified it as separate from the unitary business principle in both inquiry and purpose. 170 This justification is overshadowed by
the court’s most glaring logical misstep, for just as the court distinguished
one standard from the other, it goes on to hold that “there is no reason—
based either in case law or logic—for holding that the factors that indicate a
unitary business cannot also be relevant in determining . . . real economic
substance.” 171 After its attempts to distinguish the two taxation principles,
the court quickly blurs any true difference between the concepts. Most notably, the court fails to clarify why a factor that is unable to merit constitutional consideration under the unitary business principle is suddenly capable
of clearing those same constitutional hurdles when relabeled as part of the
real economic substance test.
Thus, the standard for establishing nexus is now even foggier because
the court not only failed to clearly differentiate between the unitary business
standard and the real economic substance test, but also inexplicably attempted to layer the unitary business principle on top of the real economic
substance test. While Armco and SYL both confirm that the real economic
substance test considers whether the parent is unitary with the out-of-state
subsidiary, neither the prior case law nor the Gore court clarify how much
weight that factor is given. As such, the court’s contention that the unitary
business principle factors also are relevant in deciding real economic substance is troubling.
The court’s decision, particularly the uncertainty involving the “confusing mix of economic substance and unitary business analysis . . . [,] will
inevitably spawn more litigation” as out-of-state companies attempt to riddle out which transactions will be taxed by the State and which transactions
are protected. 172 One practitioner frustrated by the decision, Don Griswold
of Crowell & Moring LLP, argued that the court “‘did [not] get nexus by
169. Gore, 437 Md. at 517–18, 87 A.3d at 1277.
170. Id. at 518, 87 A.3d at 1278.
171. Id.
172. Mary C. Alexander & Jeffrey A. Friedman, Maryland’s Gore-y Nexus Standard: Out-ofState Holding Companies Subject to Tax, 72 STATE TAX NOTES 97, 97 (2014).
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any standard that has ever existed in any court.’” 173 While this broad declaration may be exaggerated, one can certainly argue that the court used a
piecemeal approach when deciding this case stringing together some parts
of the unitary business principle with other parts of the real economic substance test. 174
Alexander and Friedman make a critically important observation,
pointing out that “[t]he ramifications of the Court of Appeals inconsistently
treating GEH and FVI as lacking substance for nexus purposes but treating
them as separate companies for assessment purposes results in Maryland
receiving many more years of tax assessments than it would otherwise receive.” 175 GEH and FVI’s parent company, W.L. Gore Enterprises, has
consistently filed a Maryland tax return, while the subsidiaries had never
have filed Maryland tax returns. 176 Because the statute of limitations on
Maryland tax returns is generally three years, the State can only recover but
so much from the parent company. 177 Therefore, even though W.L. Gore
had been making royalty payments to GEH since its founding in 1983,178
and likely deducting those royalty payments from its state tax returns, the
Comptroller’s 2006 audit was only about to reach Gore’s 2001–2003 tax
returns. 179 Conversely, the Comptroller was able to assess taxes, interest,
and penalties against GEH for tax years 1983 to 2003 and against FVI for
tax years 1996 to 2003. 180 The Court of Appeals’ decision thus appears to
be crafted to allow the State to recover a great deal more money because the
court simultaneously held that the subsidiaries lacked substance apart from

173. David Sawyer, Did Maryland’s Addback Statute Get Gored?, 72 STATE TAX NOTES 191,
192 (2014).
174. Alexander & Friedman, supra note 172, at 98 (observing that “Maryland’s high court
said that ‘the Tax Court identified the correct legal standard’” of real economic substance and,
“[i]mportantly, the court ruled that the lower court’s application of the unitary business principle
was wrong, writing that ‘the unitary business principle cannot be used to establish nexus . . . .’”).
175. Id.
176. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. 07-IN-OO-0084, 2010 Md.
Tax LEXIS 3, at *1 (Md. T.C. Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Gore
Enter. Holdings, Inc., 209 Md. App. 524, 60 A.3d 107 (2013), aff’d, 437 Md. 492, 87 A.3d 1263
(2014).
177. Spotlight on Maryland Taxes, Compliance Programs FAQs, COMPTROLLER OF
MARYLAND,
http://taxes.marylandtaxes.com/Resource_Library/Taxpayer_Assistance/Frequently_Asked_Quest
ions/Tax_Compliance_and_Enforcement_FAQs/Compliance_Programs_FAQs.shtml (last visited
Mar. 26, 2015).
178. Gore, 437 Md. at 500, 87 A.3d at 1267.
179. Id. at 501, 87 A.3d at 1268.
180. Id. (explaining that the Comptroller assessed $193,178 against W.L. Gore and
$26,436,315 and $2,608,895 against GEH and FVI, respectively).
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Gore 181 yet found them independent enough to be taxed separately from
their parent company. 182
Logically, the Maryland Court of Appeals’ finding of a lack of real
economic substance would imbue the subsidiaries with an identity that is
inseparable from its parent company and thus taxation would be limited to
W.L. Gore alone. The court’s decision, however, seems to skirt around this
logical conclusion, much to the detriment of a clear and generally applicable nexus standard. 183
B. As Corporations Continue to Move Their Business Out of the State,
the Gore Court’s Unwillingness to Establish a Bright-Line Test for
Taxation Extenuates Maryland’s Hostile Economic Atmosphere
The State of Maryland’s high taxes and strict regulations have resulted
in a number of Fortune 500 companies leaving the State to pursue more
“friendly” conditions in Virginia.184 Maryland’s lack of a “bright-line rule”
for taxing out-of-state subsidiaries deprives large corporations of notice as
to what types of transactions will be subject to taxation. 185 The apprehension of doing business in Maryland is real, as large corporations and many
Fortune 500 companies have been driven out of the State, costing Maryland
revenue and many of its residents jobs. 186
Both former-Lieutenant Governor Anthony Brown and Governor Larry Hogan addressed the issue of Maryland’s economic climate throughout
their respective gubernatorial campaigns.187 While Brown claimed that the
181. Id. at 517–18, 87 A.3d at 1277 (“GEH and FVI lacked substance apart from Gore, and
consequently satisfied the constitutional requirements for taxation in Maryland.”).
182. Id. at 530, 87 A.3d at 1285 (“‘Consequently, GEH’s tax liability was calculated by multiplying royalties paid by W.L. Gore times the W.L. Gore apportionment formula. For FVI, the tax
is calculated by multiplying interest paid by W. L. Gore times the W.L. Gore apportionment formula.’” (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. 07-IN-OO-0084, 2010
Md. Tax LEXIS 3, at *12 (Md. T.C. Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 209 Md. App. 524, 60 A.3d 107 (2013), aff’d, 437 Md. 492, 87 A.3d
1263 (2014))).
183. Alexander & Friedman, supra note 172, at 99 (“While the unitary business principle may
permit Maryland to tax an apportioned share of Gore’s income from its unitary business, including
income attributable to GEH and FVI, it does not presumptively validate the application of Gore’s
apportionment factor to apportion the income of GEH and FVI.”).
184. Maryland Loses Its Fourth Fortune 500 Company in as Many Years, URBAN MIDATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2012), http://urbanmidatlantic.blogspot.com/2012/08/maryland-loses-itsfourth-fortune-500.html.
185. David Sawyer, Maryland High Court Upholds Ruling in Gore, TAX ANALYSTS (March
25, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.com.
186. Elizabeth G. Olsen, McCormick, Grandaddy of American Spices, May Leave Its Baltimore Home, FORTUNE (July 7, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/mccormick-baltimore.
187. John Wagner, Candidates’ Frustrations on Display in Final Md. Gubernatorial Debate,
WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/candidatesfrustrations-on-display-in-final-md-gubernatorial-debate/2014/10/18/31a7154a-5613-11e4-ba4bf6333e2c0453_story.html.
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“top strategic goal in his administration would be ‘to have the most competitive business climate in the nation,’” Hogan mocked his opponent, calling
the damage to Maryland’s economy “self-inflicted wounds” caused by the
O’Malley-Brown administration’s onerous regulatory environment and
steep taxes. 188 Hogan, who campaigned largely on a tax-driven platform, 189
achieved a surprising win over former-Lieutenant Governor Brown. 190
Governor Hogan credited his victory to “Marylanders [holding] our leaders
accountable for eight years of failed economic policy.” 191 Governor Hogan’s defeat of heir-apparent Anthony Brown proved that issues of taxation
are public concerns, and not restricted to the courtroom or the boardroom.
The court’s decision in Gore added to the “eight years of failed economic
policy” 192 that drove voters to rally behind Governor Hogan’s campaign
and his ultimate victory.
V. CONCLUSION
In Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, the
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the State may constitutionally
tax an out-of-state subsidiary of an in-state parent company if the out-ofstate entity lacks real economic substance.193 The court’s analysis incorrectly relied on the overly fact-specific real economic substance test instead
of adopting a uniform bright-line test. 194 Although the Court of Appeals arrived at the correct result, the Gore court should have given more weight to
the unitary business principle rather than relying on an incorrect application
of the real economic substance test. 195 The Gore court expended a great
deal of effort differentiating the unitary business principle and the real economic substance test, but ultimately conflated the two analyses.196 Rather
than create a meaningful distinction between the two tests, the Court of Appeals further muddled the criteria for state taxation of an out-of-state subsidiary. 197 It is critical that Larry Hogan, the winner of the Maryland gubernatorial race, remedy Maryland’s disparaged reputation as a hostile

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Ian Shapira, For Supporters of Governor-Elect Larry Hogan, Tuesday Night was Time to
Party, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/forsupporters-of-governor-elect-larry-hogan-tuesday-night-was-time-to-party/2014/11/05/5407421a64b7-11e4-bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story.html.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 533, 87 A.3d
1263, 1287 (2014).
194. See supra Part IV.A.
195. See supra Part IV.A.
196. See supra Part IV.A.
197. See supra Part IV.A.
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business environment. 198 To keep revenue, jobs, and economic progress
within the State, Maryland must improve its corporate relationships by
abandoning the real economic substance test in favor of an assessment that
provides the proper notice to multi-state corporations. 199

198. See supra Part IV.B.
199. See supra Parts IV.A–B.

